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Abstract
Problem definition: Transshipment/inventory sharing has been used in practice because of its risk-pooling potential. However, human decision makers play a critical role in making inventory decisions in an inventory sharing system, which may
affect its benefits. We investigate whether the opportunity to transship inventory
influences decision makers’ inventory decisions and whether, as a result, the intended risk-pooling benefits materialize.
Academic/practical relevance: Previous research in transshipment, which is focused
on finding optimal stocking and sharing decisions, assumes rational decision making without any systematic bias. As one of the first to study inventory sharing from
a behavioral perspective, we demonstrate a persistent stocking-decision bias relevant for inventory sharing systems.
Methodology: We develop a behavioral model of a multilocation inventory system
with transshipments. Using four behavioral studies, we identify, test, estimate, and
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mitigate a demand-side underweighting bias: although inventory sharing brings
both a supply-side benefit and a demand-side benefit, players underestimate the
latter. We show analytically that such bias leads to underordering. We also explore
whether reframing the inventory sharing decision reduces this bias.
Results: Our results show that subjects persistently reduce their order quantities when
transshipments are allowed. This underordering, which persists even when a decision-support system suggests optimal quantities, causes insufficient inventory
in the system, in turn reducing the risk-pooling benefits of inventory sharing. Underordering is evidently caused by an underweighting bias; although players correctly estimate the supply-side potential from transshipment, they only estimate
20% of the demand-side potential.
Managerial implications: Although inventory sharing can profitably reduce inventory, too much underordering undermines its intended risk-pooling benefits. The
demand-side benefits of transshipment need to be emphasized when implementing inventory sharing systems.
Keywords: inventory sharing, behavioral operations, demand-side underweighting
bias, structural estimation

1. Introduction
Inventory sharing, also called transshipment, is used in practice because
of its potential to increase profitability and service levels through risk
pooling. Example applications stem from different industries, such as
automotive and machine tools (Narus and Anderson 1996), spare parts
(Zhao et al. 2005, 2006), fashion (Dong and Rudi 2004), wholesale/retail (Gallagher 2002), and many online trading platforms (Zhao and Bisi
2010). The notion of a sharing economy has made sharing inventory or
capacity more prevalent in everyday life as well.
The benefits of inventory sharing, for example, improving service levels, reducing system inventory, and improving profitability, ultimately
depend on inventory stocking and sharing decisions. If these decisions
are made optimally, the benefits of inventory sharing have been demonstrated through many analytical and simulation studies (e.g., Tagaras
1989, Evers 2001). There is, however, little academic research that examines how managers make such decisions. To gain a better understanding of how these decisions are made in practice, we conducted several
interviews with managers of firms from different industries and further
administered a survey in cooperation with the Association for Supply
Chain Management on these topics. Fifty-four firms responded to the
part of the survey focused on transshipments.1
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In the survey, we asked how inventory orders are created—whether
these orders are automated or made through human judgment. Among
the 54 respondents, none indicated that inventory orders are entirely
made by software without any involvement of human judgment, three
indicated that inventory orders are entirely made by human judgment,
35 indicated that inventory orders are based on software and then adjusted by human judgment, and another 10 indicated that orders represent averages between judgments and an automated order. The responses to this question highlight that inventory decisions in practice are
mostly a combination of human judgment and software. This resonates
with many documented cases where human planners regularly intervene
to adjust automated inventory orders (e.g., van Donselaar et al. 2010).
Regarding transshipments, which occur if, for example, “one distribution center runs low on a certain stock and obtains extra inventory
for replenishment from another distribution center instead of a manufacturing site,” we asked respondents how often they transship inventory within different stages in the supply chain in the past 12 months.
Responses for each stage could vary on a scale from never to extremely
often. Respondents could also indicate that they do not know or that this
supply chain stage does not apply to them. In general, inventory sharing
does not occur frequently among the firms in our sample. For the firms
indicating that some transshipments happen within their supply chains
(n = 34), we asked what usually triggers these transshipments. Not a single respondent indicated that transshipments occur because of suggestions by inventory software. Eleven respondents indicated that transshipments are triggered by centralized inventory planners, and seven
respondents indicated that these transshipments are triggered by managers at the site. Eleven firms said that transshipments are triggered by
an immediate stockout for a critical item that needs to be addressed;
this is a sign that transshipments are often less proactive but rather reactive to address “firefighting” needs. We asked firms where transshipments never or only rarely happen (n = 16) why this is the case. The most
frequently chosen answers were a lack of strategy for transshipments
(43%) and a sense of the cost of transshipping inventory generally outweighing the benefits (42%). People also indicated that their software
does not consider transshipments (36%).
These data convey that although algorithms (e.g., inventory management software) are widely used in industry to support inventory
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decision making, inventory sharing opportunities are rarely considered
by these algorithms. Consequently, store, distribution center, and manufacturing site managers must figure out the implications of inventory
sharing on their own. How they make such decisions is a critical aspect
influencing the profitability of the system. Underreacting to the inventory sharing opportunities would leave benefits of risk pooling on the
table, whereas overreacting to them could lead to a dearth of inventory
in the system. This motivates us to study the inventory sharing problem
from a behavioral perspective.
Many experiments have documented biases in inventory decisions in
the context of both single-location (e.g., Schweitzer and Cachon 2000)
and multilocation newsvendor problems (e.g., Ho et al. 2010). Therefore, we aim to investigate two research questions: (1) Does the opportunity to transship inventory between decision makers alter their ordering behavior? And (2) if yes, what is the implication of such changes to
the expected risk-pooling benefits?
To tackle these research questions, we examine the most studied inventory sharing model, that described by Rudi et al. (2001), from a behavioral perspective. Indeed, in addition to the familiar pull-to-center
bias observed in a multilocation setting without inventory sharing, we
find some persistent bias in human decision makers’ stocking decisions
when provided with inventory sharing opportunities. Note that transshipments bring both supply-side benefits (an opportunity to obtain
extra supplies from the other player) and demand-side benefits (an opportunity to sell extra products to the other player). Although in theoretical models these two benefits are equally considered in the calculation of the optimal ordering quantities, we find that decision makers
in our experiments consistently underweight the demand-side benefits. Such a bias leads to the systematic underordering of inventory because decision makers fail to perceive the extra revenue they may generate by selling to the other player. As a result, inventory sharing may
be less beneficial in practice than in theory if there is too much underordering in the system. We further explore the potential root causes as
well as potential intervention strategies to counter such a demand-side
underweighting bias.
Our paper makes several important contributions to the field of inventory sharing as well as behavioral operations management. As one of
the first papers to study the behavioral aspects of inventory sharing, we
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identified, modeled, and tested a systematic demand-side underweighting bias leading to consistent underordering behavior. Specifically, first,
we developed a new behavioral model of a multilocation inventory system with transshipments. This model assumes that in addition to the
well-known psychological costs for underage and overage that are prevalent in the newsvendor setting, a decision maker also differs in his or her
perceptions of the supply-side and demand-side benefits of inventory
sharing. We show analytically that with demand-side underweighting, a
decision maker will, in turn, underorder. Second, we designed and conducted experiments in the laboratory to examine order quantities, profits, and service-level outcomes in this context. Our experiments demonstrate that inventory sharing opportunities indeed alter our participants’
ordering behavior—they persistently underorder when given the opportunity to transship inventory. This is true after the pull-to-center effect is
taken into consideration. Such underordering persists even when decision makers are provided with a decision-support system that suggests
inventory order quantities but permits their revision (a typical practice
in industry). This underordering behavior causes a shortage of inventory in the system, which, in turn, reduces the potential for the players
to benefit from risk pooling through inventory sharing. Third, using data
from our experiments, we estimated the parameters in the proposed
behavioral model through structural estimation and showed that the
model captures inventory decisions in our context better than a model
that incorporates only the psychological cost of underage and overage.
The parameter estimates indicate that although the subjects’ evaluations
of the availability of extra supply through transshipments are close to
the correct level, their evaluations of the demand-side potential are far
off, representing only 20% of the true demand-side potential through
transshipments. Fourth, we identified several potential root causes for
such demand-side underweighting, including the desire for control, seeing reluctance in requesting in others but not in themselves, and valuing
own markets more than others’ markets. Finally, we explored several intervention strategies, such as reframing inventory sharing, automated
transshipments, and advanced decision-support tools, to mitigate this
demand-side underweighting bias.
From a practical point of view, our paper provides important guidance to decision makers of inventory sharing systems. Although inventory sharing has the potential to reduce inventory in the system because
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of risk pooling, too much underordering can undermine the intended
benefits. In addition, managers should not underestimate the demandside benefits from inventory sharing because the demand-side serves
as a secondary market for them and brings additional profit. Introducing inventory sharing systems should go together with emphasizing the
extra revenue-generating potential of such a practice.
It is worthwhile to mention that our research is also relevant in the
context of omnichannel retailing. Over the past decade, most traditional
offline retailers have built an online presence. How much to stock for
each channel and how to best fulfill orders originating from either channel remain among the top challenges for omnichannel retailers. Traditionally, many retailers held separate stocks for online and offline stores.
However, because of the benefits of risk pooling, many of them are pooling such inventory, for example, using in-store inventory for online order
fulfillment and vice versa (Alishah et al. 2017). Such an arrangement can
lead to in-store inventory being reserved for either online or offline customers, and decisions to share inventory between these two reserved
piles are often negotiated between the managers of online channels and
stores. Indeed, one of the biggest fashion retailers in the nation that we
interviewed regularly transships inventory between online and offline
stockpiles and faces the challenge of making appropriate stocking decisions for these two channels. Our research suggests that channel managers may underestimate the value of using this system to sell in the
other channel and instead primarily view this system as a way of “dipping” into the inventory reserved for the other channel.
We proceed with our paper as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In Section 3, we briefly explain the rational theory underlying our context, serving as a benchmark. In Section 4, we present
a corresponding behavioral model in which we consider the proposed
demand-side underweighting bias; we also present experimental evidence for demand-side underweighting and its impact on the profits and
service levels of the system and estimate the underweighting bias from
our behavioral model. In Section 5, we explore the root causes for demand-side underweighting and propose interventions to mitigate this
bias. In Section 6, we discuss insights from our findings and conclude
our research.
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2. Literature Review
The inventory sharing/transshipment problem has been studied extensively because the prospect of transshipments has the potential to both
improve service levels and reduce system inventory. However, most of
this research is focused on analytical modeling, characterizing optimal
stocking, and sharing decisions. Early research assumed a centralized
power that could decide how stockpiles were made available to different
players. Although such a central authority may exist, supply chains are
often more decentralized. There are ample examples of inventory sharing among independent players (e.g., Zhao et al. 2005). Correspondingly,
a large amount of analytical modeling research has examined these decentralized players’ optimal/equilibrium stocking and sharing decisions
and how appropriate incentives can induce players to choose the optimal solution. Rudi et al. (2001), referred to as RKP hereafter, studied a
single-period model and are among the first to study inventory sharing
in such a decentralized system. After developing the equilibrium order
quantities, the authors explore coordination of such a system through a
linear transfer price. Many other papers have also studied decentralized
inventory sharing systems in various settings, for example, Anupindi et
al. (2001), Zhao et al. (2005), Rong et al. (2010), Shao et al. (2011), Yan
and Zhao (2011).
Although this literature focuses on the optimal/equilibrium behavior
to extract the risk-pooling benefit of inventory sharing, it also assumes
perfectly rational decision makers who do not exhibit systematic biases. Behavioral experiments have generally challenged the assumption
of perfect rationality in stocking decisions, both in single-location (e.g.,
Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) and in multilocation newsvendor problems (e.g., Ho et al. 2010). Our research investigates the potential bias
in order quantity decisions in an inventory sharing system and its impact on the performance of such a system.
Although our research is among the first to examine the behavioral
aspects of inventory sharing, some other works in progress are also examining inventory sharing systems. For example, Bostian et al. (2012)
examine inventory orders when the system automatically makes transshipment decisions for the players and study whether decision makers
in the experiment benefit from inventory sharing by estimating structural models to establish counterfactuals. In contrast, we examine this
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question more explicitly through randomized treatments in which we
allow subjects to make their own decisions on requesting inventory and
accepting/rejecting such requests for transshipment. Two other works
are concerned with setting the transfer price of transshipments: Villa
and Katok (2018) focus on negotiation of the transfer price, and Chen
and Li (2020) focus on the sequence in setting the transfer price and
making stocking decisions. In our research, we treat the transfer price
as exogenous in order to separate the two decisions (stocking and transfer prices) and examine how decision makers react to the transfer price
in their ordering decisions.
3. Rational Theory
In this section, we briefly discuss the equilibrium solutions for rational
players in the inventory sharing system, which serve as the normative
benchmarks for our behavioral model and experiments, as well as provide basic insights into the system.
3.1. The Inventory Sharing Model

We adopt the basic framework from RKP, the single-period, two-location,
decentralized inventory sharing system where transshipments lead to
payments between parties through a transfer price. We chose this framework because (1) it is the simplest and most studied decentralized inventory sharing setting and (2) the transshipment decisions in this setting are simple, allowing us to examine decision makers’ motivations
without having to consider their bounded rationality.
Consider two independent players, one at each distinct location. Each
player faces independent random demand Di (i = 1, 2) in a single period
and must place an order Qi at price ci at the beginning of the period before observing demand. After demand is realized, each player uses his
or her own inventory to satisfy demand. For each unit of demand satisfied, a player receives revenue ri. Any unsold inventory may be salvaged
at the salvage value si < ci. The decision maker also incurs a penalty cost
of pi for each unit of unmet demand. As in RKP, we define vi = ri + pi as
the marginal value of additional sales at location i. Let Fi represent the
cumulative distribution function of Di. Without inventory sharing, this
framework corresponds to two independent newsvendors with their
optimal order quantities calculated as
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Q*i,n = Fi−1

(

vi − ci
vi − si

9

)

In the inventory sharing model, after observing demand, inventory
can be shared if one player has extra units available and the other has
a shortage. Specifically, player j may request transshipment of a certain
amount from player i, who may then decide how much, if any, to share
with player j. For each unit of inventory shared from i to j, player i receives a unit transfer price of cij from j but pays a transportation cost
τij. To avoid trivial cases, we set cij ≥ sj + τij as in RKP to ensure that the
source is willing to send (i.e., sending a unit is more profitable than salvaging the unit) and set cij ≤ vj to ensure that the recipient wants the
transshipments (i.e., requesting a unit of transshipments is more profitable than losing the sale). To simplify the decisions in the experiments,
we assume negligible transportation costs (τij = 0) throughout the paper.
Any inventory sharing problem involves two essential decisions—
how much to stock initially and how much to share or request. In this
model, because inventory sharing occurs at the end of the period after
demand is realized, a player (say i) should always request the inventory
that is needed to fill demand, that is, (Di − Qi)+, and share what is left after filling demand, that is, (Qi − Di)+. Here we define x+ = max(0, x). Therefore, the total number of units shared from i to j is
Tij = min [( Dj − Qj )+, ( Qi − Di )+ ]

Given Tij, it can be shown that a unique set of equilibrium order quantities exists for the two players, (Q*i,s, Q*j,s ), which can be calculated by
solving equation (10) in RPK.
3.2. Normative Benchmarks for Our Experiments

In Subsection 3.1, we provide general game-theoretic results. Next, we
demonstrate and discuss the specific equilibrium solutions that result
from the numerical parameters that we will later use in our experiments.
These solutions will provide the intuition our behavioral experiments.
To be consistent with the literature, we adopted most applicable parameters from RKP. Specifically, we used a symmetric system in which
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Figure 1. Theoretical Optimal Orders and Expected Profit Under Different Transfer
Prices

both players face the same parameters. Hence, we will thereafter drop
the subscripts i and j for the players. The cost parameters are r = 40, c =
20, s = 10, and p = 0. As mentioned earlier, we kept τ = 0 to simplify the
decisions in the experiments. For our numerical studies, we selected
nine levels of the transfer price in the feasible transfer price interval cij
∈ [s, v]. For demand, we adopted normal demand as in RKP with Di ~
N(200, 70.71).2 As in RKP, we also used a truncated normal distribution
when generating demand realizations to avoid negative demand. Using
the theoretical results, we calculated the equilibrium order quantities
Q*s. Figure 1 presents the equilibrium order quantities and expected
profit as cij increases and compares these with the case in which sharing is prohibited (Q*n = 230).
The equilibrium order quantity Q*s increases as the transfer price increases, with Q*s < Q*n at the lowest transfer price (cij = 10) and Q*s > Q*n
at the highest transfer price (cij = 40). This result follows directly from
the theoretical results in RKP. The basic intuition of this result is that
depending on the transfer price, transshipments can be viewed as an
additional source of either uncertain supply or uncertain demand. Specifically, at the lowest transfer price cij = s = 10, transshipments are a
good source of supply but not a good source of demand (a player earns
no more than the salvage value from transshipped inventory). Therefore, to maximize profit, players should order less (than the no-sharing
model) to capitalize on this potential supply source. By contrast, when
cij = v = 40, transshipments are a good source of demand but not of supply (a player buys a transshipped unit at the selling price, earning zero
profit). Hence, players should order more (than the no-sharing model)
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to take advantage of this possible extra demand source. As the transfer
price increases, the tendency to take advantage of possible extra demand
from the other player increases. At the same time, the tendency to take
advantage of the possible supply from the other player decreases. Both
these tendencies cause players to order more initial inventory as the
transfer price increases. Therefore, for rational players, a right transfer
price can achieve a desirable stocking level and thus coordinate the system. As Figure 1(b) shows, in our setting, the transfer price of 23 coordinates the system and maximizes the expected profit.
4. Demand-Side Underweighting in Inventory Sharing
Having defined the rational equilibrium order quantities in Section 3, in
this section, we will discuss behavioral reasons that may lead to deviations from the rational benchmark, that is, demand-side underweighting (Section 4.1). We then demonstrate such deviations through a series
of controlled experiments and examine their implication for the effectiveness of the inventory sharing system (Section 4.2). We further estimate the parameters of our behavioral model and quantify such behavioral bias through another set of experiments (Section 4.3).
4.1. Behavioral Theory

In this section, we propose a behavioral theory that explains why subjects’ order decisions may deviate from the rational benchmark discussed in Section 3. Specifically, we propose that players suffer from a
demand-side underweighting bias: although they intuitively understand
that the opportunity to request transshipments from the other player
provides them with an extra source of supply (supply-side benefits), they
underestimate the potential for additional sales through transshipment
requests from the other player (demand-side benefits). As the preceding
section emphasizes, rational equilibrium strategies are based on both
supply-side and demand-side benefits, with order quantities being below the newsvendor quantity for low transfer prices (when supply-side
benefits are more salient) and above the news vendor quantity for high
transfer prices (when demand-side benefits are more salient). Demandside underweighting points to an asymmetry—people focus more on
the supply-side benefits than on the demand-side benefits of inventory
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sharing. To investigate how this asymmetry affects players’ initial orders, we developed the following behavioral transshipment model. Recall that a rational player j expects the transshipment from player i as
Tij = min [( Dj − Qj )+, ( Qi − Di )+ ]

(1)

Tij = min [( Dj − Qj )+, α ( Qi − Di )+ ]

(2)

Tji = min [( Qj − Dj )+, β ( Di − Qi )+]

(3)

Equation (1) implies that player j is aware that the transshipments he or
she can obtain from the other player are subject to how much the other
player can supply, and player j has an unbiased expectation of the extra
supply from the other player. But a biased player may not correctly estimate the supply available from the other player—player j may expect
the transshipments he or she can obtain from player i as
where α = 1 indicates that player j has an unbiased estimation of the extra supply available to him or her from the other player, whereas α >(<)1
indicates that player j will overestimate (underestimate) the inventory
supply from the other player. Likewise, a biased player j may evaluate
the amount he or she can sell to player i as
where β = 1 indicates that player j is unbiased in estimating the amount
he or she could sell to the other player, whereas β < (>)1 indicates that
player j underestimates (overestimates) the opportunity of selling to the
other player. When β _ 0, player j is totally ignorant of the demand-side
opportunity to sell to the other player.
Both players decide their initial orders subject to the biased valuation
of the supply/demand-side opportunities characterized by (2) and (3)
rather than (1), thus leading to suboptimal ordering. Specifically, Proposition 1 shows the condition under which players exhibit underordering behavior. Recall that Q*s denotes the equilibrium order quantity under inventory sharing for rational players; that is, α = 1 and β = 1. Let
Qs(α, β) be the equilibrium order quantity for biased players. Proposition 1 characterizes the relationship between Qs(α, β) and Q*s .
Proposition 1. Qs(α, β) decreases in α and increases in β. When (α = 1
and β < 1) or (α > 1 and β = 1), players exhibit underordering behavior,
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that is, Qs(α, β) <Q*s.

The proof is in the supplement. Proposition 1 suggests that biased
players may lower their initial orders when given the inventory sharing opportunity because of the asymmetry between the perceived supply-side and demand-side benefits either because of (1) overestimating
sharing as an extra supply source (i.e., overweighting the supply-side
benefit) or because of (2) underestimating sharing as an extra selling opportunity (i.e., underweighting demand-side benefits). In the following
sections, we will design and report a series of experiments to explore a
player’s demand-side underweighting bias in inventory sharing and estimate the value of α and β using data from our experiments.
4.2. Evidence for Demand-Side Underweighting

We designed our first study to examine ordering and transshipment decisions under inventory sharing for products with different profit margins. We know from existing behavioral newsvendor research that decision makers—even without the opportunity to share inventory—place
orders with less-than-optimal quantities in high-margin conditions and
order more than the optimal quantities in low-margin conditions (the socalled pull-to-center effect; see, e.g., Zhang and Siemsen 2019). Because
of the potential asymmetry between the perceived supply-side and demand-side benefits, we believe that participants may in addition experience a demand-side underweighting bias when given the opportunity to
share inventory. With a low transfer price, the supply-side benefits of inventory sharing are very salient for decision makers. We thus expect that
the opportunity to share inventory will lead to a reduction in initial orders.
Hypothesis 1a. Under inventory sharing with a low transfer price, subjects will lower their orders compared with the case without inventory
sharing.

By contrast, with a high transfer price, the supply side of inventory
sharing (i.e., getting supplementary inventory from the other player) is
not very profitable, whereas the demand side (i.e., selling to the other
player through transshipments) is highly profitable. Hence, rational players should increase their order quantity. However, because demand-side
underweighting means that this profitable aspect of inventory sharing
is not very salient for decision makers, we expect that inventory sharing
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with a high transfer price has little impact on initial order quantities. In
other words, we expect initial orders to be like those in a situation without inventory sharing.
Hypothesis 1b. Under inventory sharing with a high transfer price, subjects will not increase their orders compared with the case without inventory sharing.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b require us to vary inventory sharing and the
transfer price as treatments. The hypotheses are independent of the
profit margin of the underlying newsvendor problem. Hence, we expect these hypotheses to hold across both high- and low-margin conditions. However, we include profit margin as an experimental factor for
robustness.
4.2.1. Experimental Design. Our experimental task builds on a classic newsvendor design. We instructed participants to manage a product
in a retail setting. In each period, they place their initial inventory orders before knowing their demand realization. As discussed in Section
3, revenues and costs followed a standard price/cost framing in which
the sales price for the high-margin condition was set at $40, the purchase cost at $20, and the salvage value at the end of the period at $10.
We manipulated the experimental design through transfer prices at levels of $15 and $35, which are below and above the coordinating transfer
price (i.e., $23), respectively. We used these two transfer prices to test
whether a higher transfer price induces a higher order quantity than a
lower transfer price does (in accordance with Figure 1(a)), which is the
premise for coordinating the system through the transfer price. We explicitly informed participants that the actual cost of a lost sale was $0
to avoid ambiguity about the implications of stockouts. The critical fractile was 66% for the no-sharing newsvendor model. In the corresponding low-margin condition, the sales price was also set at $40, but we increased the purchase cost to $30, leading to a critical fractile of 33%.
Demand in each period was normally distributed with a mean of 200
and a standard deviation of 70.71 and was truncated at zero. Without
inventory sharing, the optimal order quantity is 230 units in the highmargin condition and 170 units in the low-margin condition.
Before starting the experiment, we provided participants with
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Table 1. Overview of Experiments with/without Inventory Sharing
Condition
Sharing
		
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

Critical
fractile

Optimal
order

No

66%

230

Yes

66%

237

No

Yes
Yes
Yes

33%
66%
33%
33%

170

Transfer
Participants
price 		
—
—

26

209.74

24

206.89

24

212

$15

26

186

$35

26

162

$35
$15

Order
quantity

26

194.07
197.79
185.80
187.50

instructions about the normal distribution, and we depicted the density
function of the demand distribution on their screens. Random draws
of demand were different for each participant. As the experiment proceeded, these demand draws were plotted in a time-series graph as
well as shown in a table. Demand draws across periods were independent, and participants were informed about that. Participants repeated
the task for 30 time periods. They were compensated on completion
based on their profits obtained across all periods. Their total compensation was based on $6 for showing up in addition to 0.0095% of their
total profits earned across all experimental conditions. Average payment per participant was $15.51. The experiment was implemented in
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted with a standardized subject
pool at a large American public university. Participants were mostly undergraduate students at the university. Sessions were scheduled to last
for 45 minutes. Participants were randomly assigned to different treatments (e.g., sharing or no sharing) in each session and were required to
watch a five-minute video explaining their corresponding experimental task. They also had access to written instructions at any time during the experiment. We used a between-subjects design, varying three
factors: (1) inventory sharing, (2) profit margin, and (3) transfer price.
Because the transfer price has no meaning under no inventory sharing,
this design resulted in six experimental conditions, summarized in Table 1. Summary statistics, including average order quantities and profits, for all experimental conditions in our paper are provided in Table
A1 in the supplement.
Participants were grouped into channels of four or six players. Channels were unrestricted in size in no-sharing conditions. Each channel
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was fixed on one experimental condition. Subjects did not know that
they were associated with a channel. We informed them that they would
be matched to a random player after each period. This random matching was specific to channels. Under inventory sharing, subjects could
request supplementary inventory transshipments from their matched
player after observing their own demand. Participants could not see the
other player’s inventory orders or demand. The other player could then
decide to send transshipments to the requester up to (but not exceeding) the number of units requested. In principle, both players could request and send transshipments to each other in the same period. There
were no transshipment costs besides the transfer payment.

4.2.2. Analysis. We first examine order quantities as our dependent
variable. The model we use to analyze our experimental data has the
following structure:
Orderi = a1 + a2C2i + a3C3i + a4C4i + a5C5i
+ a6C6i + b1D1i + b2D2i + εi

(4)

Here Orderi denotes the average order quantity of participant i across
all 30 periods. We code the experimental conditions with dummy variables (e.g., C3 takes the value of one only if the observation is made in
condition 3) and include them in our analysis, as Equation (4) demonstrated. The base case is the high-margin, no-sharing case (i.e., C1). Our
only control variable in this analysis is the average demand faced by subjects. Demand is by design uncorrelated with treatments and thus does
not bias our treatment effect estimates. Despite participants knowing
that the underlying demand distribution stays the same across periods,
they react strongly to the observed demand signals, thus introducing
noise to their observed order decision. Adding this control variable thus
creates econometric efficiency benefits (i.e., more precise coefficient estimates). We expect a nonlinearity in the effect of demand; in particular,
there should be decreasing effects of observed demand on order quantities because the likelihood of obtaining profit (and thus the chance of
positive reinforcement) decreases with higher orders. We estimate a
spline regression on our combined experimental data with an estimated
knot. Results indicate that this knot is very close to mean demand (b =
200.65, p = 0.90 for difference with 200); hence we fix the spline knot
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Table 2. Regression Estimates from Experiments with/Without Inventory Sharing
All 30 periods

Condition
C2: Low margin, no sharing
C3: High margin, low transfer price
C4: High margin, high transfer price
C5: Low margin, low transfer price
C6: Low margin, high transfer price
Average demand (≤200)
Average demand (>200)
Constant
N
R2

Coef.

SE

−7.87
(5.95)
−7.11
(5.82)
3.58
(5.91)
−18.69**
(5.76)
−15.20**
(5.81)
1.07**
(0.30)
0.64**
(0.22)
−8.51
(58.82)
152 		
31% 		

Last 15 periods
Coef.

SE

−17.76**
(6.78)
−14.89*
(6.63)
−2.05
(6.88)
−26.31**
(6.63)
−23.89**
(6.66)
0.50*
(0.03)
0.28
(0.17)
110.07*
(45.51)
152
23%

The omitted category is condition 1, that is, the high-margin, no-sharing condition. All coefficients measure differences in order quantities compared with this condition. Coef., coefficients;
SE, standard error.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01

at 200 throughout. Accordingly, we include D1i = min(Di, 200) and D2i =
(Di − 200)+ as controls.
Although our data are recorded as decisions, our unit of analysis is
an individual; that is, we average decisions across time periods for an
individual. Variance of our treatments occurs between subjects, which
means that the treatment effects are only identified by between-subject
variance. Further, this aggregation allows us to reduce the complexity
of our model specification because we do not need to consider the details of adequately lagging control variables but can rely on averages instead. Because multiple individuals were nested in a z-Tree channel, we
first estimated a random effects model to examine this potential for dependence within our data. This concern about individuals being nested
in a channel during the experiment was recently highlighted as a methodological consideration in behavioral operations by Hyndman and Embrey (2018). However, in our case, the standard deviation of the channel random effects accounts for only 3% of the total error variance; we
thus resorted to ordinary least squares regression analysis instead. Regression results are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 suggests that with a low transfer price, subjects lower their
orders when inventory sharing is allowed, with a decrease of 10.82
(= 18.69 − 7.87, p = 0.06) under a low-margin case and a decrease of
7.11 (p = 0.22) under a high-margin case. This is due to the salience of
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supply-side benefits under a low transfer price. With a high transfer
price, although subjects should increase their orders according to the
normative theory, they do not do so, with a decrease of 7.33 (= 15.2 −
7.87, p = 0.21) under the low-margin case and an increase of only 3.58
(p = 0.55) under the high-margin case. This provides evidence that subjects underweight the demand-side benefits under a high transfer price.
To formally test Hypothesis 1a, we estimated a joint contrast between
conditions 1 and 3 (for the high-margin case) as well as conditions 2 and
5 (for the low-margin case). Results from this contrast weakly support
Hypothesis 1a by suggesting that the mean order quantities in the context of a low transfer price are less than those under the no-sharing setting (F = 2.49, p ≤ 0.10). Descriptively, 73% of subjects in conditions 3
and 5 (low transfer price setting across different margins) order less on
average than the corresponding mean order quantities in conditions 1
and 2 (no-sharing cases across different margins). A similar contrast between conditions 1 and 4 as well as conditions 2 and 6 reveals that order
quantities with a high transfer price do not exceed the order quantities
without sharing (F = 0.98, p = 0.38). Only 36% of subjects in conditions
4 and 6 have average order quantities that exceed their corresponding
average order quantities in conditions 1 and 2. These observations support Hypothesis 1b and are consistent with the idea that relative to the
supply side, people underweight the demand-side benefit of inventory
sharing. To examine whether our results are influenced by participant
experience, we repeated our analysis using only the last 15 decision periods. Results from this analysis are also reported in Table 2. The results
from our hypotheses tests become stronger in this analysis, providing
support to both Hypothesis 1a (F = 3.33, p = 0.04) and Hypothesis 1b (F
= 0.45, p = 0.63). Subjects also tend to be less influenced by demand observations in the last 15 periods.
We also examined subjects’ transshipment decisions in all sharing
conditions. Specifically, we calculated the optimal request for each subject and period (which is defined as OptRequest = [Demand-Order]+) and
then established the difference between this optimal request and the
actual request made. Similarly, we calculated the optimal send (which
is defined as OptSend = min[Request, Leftover]) and contrasted the optimal send with the actual amount sent. Note that our subjects should
have had no difficulties in calculating these optimal requests/sends
themselves because their shortages and leftovers were displayed on the
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Table 3. Requests Made by Recipients in the Sharing Setting
		

Recipient has

		
Shortage 		 No shortage
Request		(order < demand) 		(order ≥ demand)
Nothing
Below shortage
Exactly shortage
More than shortage

132
249
1,200
27

8.2%
15.5%
74.6%
1.7%

1,608 		

1378
—
—
74

1,452

94.9%
—
—
5.1%

screen during the experiment (see screen shots in the supplement). Table 3 contains an overview of all 3,060 requests made under both highand low-margin sharing treatments.

We differentiate between situations in which the recipient had a
shortage and situations in which no shortage existed. It is straightforward for participants to understand that they have enough inventory
to meet demand if no shortage exists; indeed, we see that in 94.9% of
the cases where there was sufficient inventory to meet demand, participants requested no additional inventory (subjects are allowed to request inventory even without shortages). However, when a shortage existed, it became interesting to examine whether participants requested
what they needed. We see that recipients’ requests exactly matched their
shortages only 74.6% of the time. In the other 23.7% (= 8.2% + 15.5%)
of situations, subjects generally requested less (instead of more) than
they needed. Because the source is likely to use the recipient’s requests
as information to estimate expected demand from this secondary market, such underrequesting bias means that the source processes censored information. As a result, the source would generally lower the
estimate of the potential sales volume in the secondary market, thus
leading to the underweighting of the demand side of inventory sharing.
To examine how the source responds to inventory requests, we focused on the 1,550 (= 249 + 1,200 + 27 + 74; see Table 3) periods in
which nonzero inventory was requested. Note that if a recipient requested no inventory, the source could not send any inventory, justifying the removal of such situations from the analysis of transshipments
sent. A key to our analysis here was to interpret transshipment decisions
both within the context of what was requested and what the source had
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Table 4. Transshipments Made Upon Request in the Sharing Setting

Source Has

Transshipment
Below availability
At availability
Below requested
At requested

Sufficient inventory
(request ≤ availability)
—
—
—
—
35
10.1%
313
89.9%
348 		

Insufficient inventory
(request > availability)
50
972
86
94
1,202

4.2%
80.9%
7.2%
7.8%

available. Table 4 examines how sources respond with transshipments
to recipients’ requests, depending on whether the request exceeds their
available inventory.

It was apparent that most sources either fulfilled a request or sent
what they had available. Strikingly, in 15% (= 7.2% + 7.8%) of situations
in which inventory requests exceeded a source’s availability (i.e., leftover
supply), the source nevertheless complied with these requests and transshipped to the recipients more inventory than it had available. In doing
so, the sources didn’t satisfy all their own demand despite being able to
sell this inventory at a higher margin in their own market. Note that the
software we use in our experiment allows this to happen because profit
is only realized after transshipments are completed. This indicates that
participants tend to transship more than they should. This tendency
to oversend inventory is stronger than the tendency to undersend. Because recipients are likely to use sources’ response to their requests as
information to estimate the extra supply through transshipments, such
oversending bias means that the recipients process inflated information
about the inventory availability at the source. This, in turn, may also lead
to the underweighting of the demand-side of inventory sharing.
Our analysis provides additional arguments that support demandside underweighting. We found evidence that people persistently under-request inventory from their partners and oversend inventory to
their partners; this further supports the notion of demand-side underweighting in inventory sharing. Decision makers lower their estimate
of the demand-side benefit of sharing because they observe generally
low requests.
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4.2.3. Profitability Implications. To examine how inventory sharing influences the profitability of players, we estimated the effect of our treatments on participants’ profits. The model we use is similar to Equation
(4), with an additional control variable: the standard deviation of demand. We further add the average order quantities as a covariate to examine whether subjects who ordered more (or less) in particular conditions were able to obtain higher profits. Results from the analysis are
summarized in Table A2 in the supplement. Inventory sharing generally
increases profits. Effect sizes are fairly consistent, with profits in condition 1 (high margin, no sharing) being lower than profits in condition 3
(b = 185.40, p ≤ 0.01) and condition 4 (b = 223.91, p ≤ 0.01), that is, high
margin with low and high transfer prices, respectively. Similarly, profits
in condition 2 (low margin, no sharing)were lower than profits in condition 5 (b = 238.93, p ≤ 0.01) and condition 6 (b = 226.83, p ≤ 0.01), that
is, low margin with low and high transfer prices, respectively. On average, those with higher order quantities in conditions 1, 3, and 4 (high
margin) and those with lower order quantities in conditions 2 and 5 (low
margin) could obtain more profit. Notably, the average order under condition 6 is 188 (as seen in Table A1 in the supplement), which is close to
the optimal order 186 in this condition. Thus, a change in order quantities under condition 6 does not impact profits on average.
To further break down the profitability implications of inventory
sharing, we take our observations from conditions 3 and 4 as an example (labeled as “Original” in Table 5) and compare the observed profit
as well as the observed service level in these conditions with profits
and service levels under several hypothetical counterfactuals. The counterfactual scenarios are (1) if there was no sharing of inventory in this
condition (with the same order quantities as in “Original”), (2) if there
was no sharing of inventory and hence optimal newsvendor order quantities were placed (= 230), (3) if transshipment decisions were made
optimally (with the same order quantities as in “Original”), and (4) if
transshipment decisions were made optimally (with optimal order quantities factoring in transshipments (= 212/237) for both players). We focus on conditions 3 and 4 (high-margin, low and high transfer price,
respectively) because inventory sharing is typically implemented for
high-margin products, and demand-side underweighting leads to forgone profits for the high-margin conditions specifically. Under low-margin conditions, subjects tend to overorder under no sharing because
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Table 5. Service Levels and Profitability in Conditions 3 and 4 with Counterfactuals
		
Condition Outcome
		
C3
C4

Service level
Profit
Service level
Profit

No Sharing

(1)
Original
orders

47.7%
3,084
55.9%
3,075

Sharing

(2)		(3)
Optimal
Original Optimal
orders 		
sharing

66.7%
3,312
68.8%
3,264

58.7%
3,293
66.1%
3,322

59.9%
3,325
68.1%
3,369

(4)
Optimal sharing
& orders
70.3%
3,499
83.2%
3,442

of the pull-to-center effect. Underordering behavior in inventory sharing thus counterbalances the pull-to-center effect and pushes the order
closer to the optimal. Results from the analysis on conditions 3 and 4
are summarized in Table 5.

Profit and service level comparisons between the “Original” and our
counterfactual scenarios (1) and (2) indicate that the ability to share inventory increases profitability (3,293 > 3,084 and 3,322 > 3,075) by a
similar amount as ordering optimally would do in a no-sharing system
(3,312 > 3,084 and 3,264 > 3,075). Service levels increase in condition 3
(58.7% > 47.7%) as well as in condition 4 (66.1% > 55.9%) because of
the increased inventory availability through transshipments. Note that
in condition 4, this makes service levels comparable to optimal newsvendor ordering (= 68.8%).
Examining scenarios (3) and (4), we can determine that suboptimal
requesting and sending have an impact on profitability, both in condition 3 (3,325 > 3,293) and in condition 4 (3,369 > 3,322). By ordering
the optimal quantity, we can see a further significant increase in profitability for condition 3 (3,499 > 3,325) as well as for condition 4 (3,442
> 3,369). Stated differently, in both conditions, on average, about $163
of profits are foregone under inventory sharing because of ineffective
requesting/transshipment decisions and suboptimal order quantities,
where the latter aspect explains about 73% of this profit differential.
Our analysis highlights that although inventory sharing does provide
significant benefits, even for nonrational decision makers, a significant
portion of the benefits of inventory sharing are not realized because order quantities are too low in high-margin contexts and because sharing
decisions are not made optimally.
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4.2.4. Replication with Decision Support. We replicated the high-margin treatments in a context with decision support. In practice, most inventory managers have access to a decision-support tool when preparing
their initial order quantities, but this tool rarely considers transshipments. Hence, we implemented this aspect by offering players a recommended order quantity (the optimal newsvendor order quantities
derived from forecasts made by a single exponential smoothing model
with a very low smoothing parameter) that they could accept or revise.
This approach is similar to the decision-support treatment in Lee and
Siemsen (2017).
Our results (see Table A3 in the supplement) suggest that with decision support, average orders under the low transfer price with sharing
are still less than the no-sharing average orders (b = −14.56, p ≤ 0.10),
and the average orders are not significantly different between no sharing
and the high transfer price setting (b = −7.42, p = 0.15). Thus, demandside underweighting bias persists even in the presence of decision support, where decision makers have the right to revise the system’s suggested order quantity.
4.3. Fixed Roles and Estimation of Behavioral Model

In the preceding subsection, we provided evidence for a demand-side
underweighting bias. In this subsection, we will quantify this bias with
estimates (α and β) derived from the behavioral model developed in Section 4.1. We conducted additional experiments for this purpose because
the behavioral parameters in the model cannot be uniquely identified
using data from the previous experiments. Different values of α and β
could lead to similar model-implied order quantities. We thus introduce
a fixed-role treatment in which we separated the roles among participants. Specifically, instead of allowing participants to be both sources
and recipients of transshipped inventory, we randomly assigned them
roles as either a source or a recipient throughout the experiment. Recipient players saw only the supply side of inventory sharing, whereas
source players saw only the demand side. This separation of roles allows us to identify values of α and β by using an experimental treatment.
4.3.1. Experiment Design. The experimental task in the fixed-role
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treatment is the same as in our previous experiments. The key treatment we introduce here is the assignment of fixed roles. In addition to
their random assignment as either a source or a recipient throughout the
experiment, a source player was randomly matched to a recipient player
in his or her channel in each period. We also varied the transfer price as
an experimental factor. Because our variable of interest now becomes
the role assignment within this treatment, more subjects were recruited
within the fixed-role treatment than in the previous treatments. We collected data from 83 subjects across both transfer price treatments (44
in the high transfer price treatment, 40 in the low transfer price treatment). One subject in the high transfer price treatment left the experiment before completion because of a medical emergency, and her data
were removed from the analysis. Note also that the fixed-role treatment
was run exclusively under the high-margin conditions because we have
established that the different profit margin had little influence on the
prevalence of supply-side and demand-side thinking. As a normative
benchmark, recipient players should order 226 and 210 under transfer
prices of 35 and 15, respectively, whereas source players should order
241 and 232 under transfer prices of 35 and 15, respectively.

4.3.2. Analysis. Our data analysis strategy is similar to the analysis in
Section 4.2. One key difference in the analysis lies in our coding approach; although in Section 4.2 experimental conditions were dummy
coded, we use dummy codes to represent experimental factors (e.g.,
three dummy variables—Recipient, Source, and TP = 35 to indicate the
transfer price) in the fixed-role treatment. The main results from this
model estimation are shown in Table 6. The results show that although
the transfer price affects the orders of recipient players (b = 14.41, t =
2.20, p ≤ 0.05), source players seem unaffected by the transfer price in
their ordering behavior (b = −0.16, t = 0.02, p = 0.98). Further, recipient
players across transfer price conditions have lower overall order quantities than those of the recipient + source players (t = −1.63, p ≤ 0.10),
whereas source players have similar overall order quantities as those
of the recipient + source players (t = 0.45, p = 0.65). This observation is
consistent with demand-side underweighting. Recipient players experience the supply side of inventory sharing, which leads them to lower
order quantities; their order quantities increase as the potential of this
supply-side benefit decreases with an increased transfer price. However,
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Table 6. Regression Results for Fixed-Role Treatment

Coef. 		

Recipient
−9.44 		
Source
7.14 		
TP = 35
10.08		
Recipient × TP = 35
4.33		
Source × TP = 35
−10.24		
Average demand (≤ 200)
0.71*		
Average demand (> 200)
0.53*		
Constant
54.89 		
N 		
133
R2 		18%
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SE
(6.39)
(6.33)
(5.99)
(8.92)
(8.89)
(0.30)
(0.27)
(59.63)

The omitted category is recipient + source. Coef., coefficient; SE, standard error.
* p ≤ 0.05

source players see only the demand side of inventory sharing and do not
react to the increased potential of the demand-side benefit as the transfer price increases because of demand-side underweighting.

4.3.3. Estimation of the Behavioral Model. Fixed roles allow us to differentiate between the effects of overestimating the supply side of inventory sharing and underestimating its demand side. Essentially, the fixedrole experiment for the source players imposes α _ 0 and isolates the
impact of β on source players’ ordering behaviors. Similarly, the fixedrole experiment for recipient players essentially imposes β = 0 and isolates the impact of α on recipient players’ ordering behaviors.
To estimate our behavioral model, we need to account for the pullto-center effect in newsvendor experiments. In our high-margin setting,
the pull-to-center effect also leads to underordering behavior. If the pullto-center effect is not accounted for, underordering would be attributed
entirely to demand-side underweighting bias, leading to incorrect estimates. Like Ho et al. (2010), we capture the pull-to-center effect in newsvendor experiments by modeling the psychological cost of overage and
underage, that is, δo and δu. Together, our behavioral model has the following behavior parameters, denoted as θ = (α, β, δo, δu).
We included three experimental designs under both high/low transfer prices (i.e., no sharing, sharing, fixed roles) for the estimation of θ =
(α, β, δo, δu). Let Qn be the equilibrium order quantity from our behavioral
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model for the no-sharing treatment, Qs,cij for the sharing treatment with
transfer price cij, and Qss,cij and Qrs,cij the equilibrium order quantities with
transfer price cij from our behavioral model for source and recipient
players, respectively. Given parameter θ = (α, β, δo, δu), we can solve for
a unique set of equilibrium order quantities (Qn, Qs,cij, Qrs,cij, Qss,cij ). Specifically, Qn is given by the modified critical fractile; that is,
Qn = F −1

(

v − c + δu
v − s + δu + δo

)

The solution technique for (Qs,cij, Qrs,cij, Qss,cij ) is given in the supplement.
The actual order quantities observed in the experiments may deviate
from the prediction of our behavioral model because of noise in the players’ decision process. We assume that the average order quantity made
by each subject is normally distributed, with the mean order quantity
across subjects specified by our behavioral model; that is,
qi,n ~N(Qn(θ), σ2n ),

qi,s,cij ~N(Qs,cij(θ), σ2s,cij),

qri,s,cij ~N (Qrs,cij (θ), σrs,cij 2), and
qsi,s,cij ~N(Qss,cij (θ), σss,cij 2).

The noise parameters σ2n, σ2s,cij, (σrs,cij)2, and (σss,cij)2 are specific to each
treatment; the behavioral parameter θ is assumed to be common across
all treatments. We use maximum likelihood to estimate the full behavioral model and two nested models. The details of the estimation procedure are included in the supplement.
The estimation results are shown in Table 7. Column (1) of the table
shows the full behavioral model, which supports our expectation that
β <1 (p < 0.01); that is, subjects underestimate how much they can sell
to the other players. In addition, the results do not support α <1 (p =
0.321); that is, subjects do not underestimate or overestimate the supply that is available from the other players. This finding implies that the
observed underordering behavior can be mainly attributed to underestimation of the demand-side opportunity of selling through transshipments—players generally view transshipment as an additional source
of supply instead. These parameter estimates further support the idea
of demand-side underweighting bias when players have inventory sharing opportunities.
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Table 7. Estimation Results of the Behavioral Model
Parameters

(1)

(2)

0.833
22.106
(0.455)
(31.239)
β
0.198
4.931e-6
(0.245)
(5.01e-6)
δo
12.540
34.243
(12.567)
(25.680)
δu
4.443
24.256
(13.564)
(26.382)
−ln L
704.382
748.717
LR test		
χ2 = 88.67
		p ≤ 0.01
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(3)

α

LR, likelihood ratio.

707.142
χ2 = 5.52
p ≤ 0.10

The results of the two nested models are shown in columns (2) and
(3) of Table 7. Column (2) shows the results of the model that does not
allow for the psychological costs of overage/underage (i.e., δo = δu = 0),
and column (3) shows the results of the model that does not allow for
demand-side underweighting bias (i.e., α = β = 1). The likelihood-ratio
(LR) test shows that the behavioral model that allows for both the psychological cost of overage/underage and demand-side underweighting
bias better explains the data than these two nested models. Without incorporating the psychological costs of overage/underage, which account
for the pull-to-center effect, we will overstate the demand-side underweighting bias, as shown in column (2) of Table 7.
The ratio of the estimated values for the psychological cost factors
in column (3) of Table 7 is similar to that reported in Ho et al. (2010)
(δu/δo= 0.65 in Ho et al. (2010) versus δu/δo= 0.71 in this study). However, when we introduced our behavioral factors α and β into the estimation, this ratio changed. Column (1) in Table 7 shows that the ratio
δu/δo drops to 0.35—in other words, the psychological costs of underage become even less salient once inventory sharing is factored into the
decision-making process. It is possible that decision makers under inventory sharing no longer attribute some of the responsibility for an inventory shortage to themselves but to the other player.
5. Exploring Root Causes and Possible Mitigation Strategies
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In this section, we examine several potential underlying reasons for demand-side underweighting and the resulting strategies to mitigate this
bias. We begin by discussing existing theories for underordering behavior to see if they provide plausible explanations of such underordering associated with inventory sharing, followed by more novel proposed explanations (Section 5.1) combined with additional experiments
to explore these explanations (Section 5.2). We then investigate several
alternatives that may help mitigate demand-side underweighting (Section 5.3).
5.1. Root Causes

In this subsection, we provide a systematic discussion of existing behavioral theories to explain the observed underordering behavior (including psychological costs of overstocking/understocking, mean anchoring,
overconfidence, and risk aversion), followed by three proposed novel
root causes underpinning demand-side underweighting.
5.1.1. Existing Theories. Psychological costs of overstocking/ understocking—a key explanation for the pull-to-center effect—could lead to
underordering. To account for the psychological underage and overage
costs, we deliberately included these factors in the estimation of our
behavioral model in the fixed-role treatment. Our estimation results indicate that the model incorporating demand-side underweighting bias
better explains the data than the one with only psychological overage/
underage costs. More generally, if players experience strong psychological overage costs, they will be hesitant to increase their orders in anticipation of potential transshipment demand. However, they should expect
similar behavior from the other player; hence, they should not expect
much supply-side benefit from inventory sharing either. Explaining demand-side underweighting ultimately requires incorporating a behavioral asymmetry between a player’s own behavior and the other player’s behavior.
Mean anchoring could also result in underordering for the high-margin treatments (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000). Given that the order decision under inventory sharing is more complex than the order decision
under no sharing, subjects may be more inclined to anchor on mean
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demand as a heuristic, resulting in an order quantity under inventory
sharing that is closer to the mean demand (e.g., 200), that is, lower than
the order quantity under no sharing. However, this argument cannot explain why participants reduce their inventory orders further (i.e., order
further away from mean demand) under the low-margin sharing treatments, as shown in Table 2.
Overconfidence can also cause underordering (Ren and Croson 2013).
Overconfidence implies that decision makers underestimate the standard deviation of the underlying demand distribution. In the inventory
sharing context, this could, in turn, imply that players overestimate their
own (and the other player’s) service level, thereby underestimating their
own (and the other player’s) propensity to request inventory and overestimating the other player’s (and their own) propensity to have inventory available. Notice, though, that the effect of overconfidence also
seems symmetrical— it would lead to an underestimation of the potential of both the demand side and the supply side of inventory sharing;
hence it does not appear to be able to explain our situation.
Risk aversion could also lead to underordering because a risk-averse
player may be reluctant to invest much into inventory for future uncertain demand either of his or her own or through transshipments. However, our theoretical analysis of risk aversion suggests the opposite: a
risk-averse player will order more inventory under sharing than under
no sharing (see Figure A1 in the supplement). Inventory sharing lowers
the supply chain risk of not matching demand and supply, thus encouraging a higher order quantity. More fundamentally, classical behavioral
newsvendor theories, such as risk aversion, mostly focus on how human
decision makers balance the uncertain demand and certain supply (the
order will be delivered for sure) and do not differentiate the risk from
the uncertain demand and uncertain supply. However, the observed underordering behavior in our experiments points to an asymmetry: the
risk of not being able to send excess inventory to the other player (i.e.,
uncertain demand) is more salient than the risk of not being able to receive inventory from the other player (i.e., uncertain supply). Therefore,
any possible causes must explain such asymmetry and discuss how decision makers balance uncertain supply and uncertain demand.

5.1.2. Proposed Explanations. Having explored the preceding, we propose some additional causes for demand-side underweighting. Desire
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for control over their environment (Leotti et al. 2010) can manifest in
a preference for choice and sometimes even in a preference for the illusion of control through choice. In our context, transshipments are not
under the direct control of either player but require the consent of both
players. However, according to the sequence of events, it is the recipient
who initiates a transshipment with his or her request, and the source
can only respond to this request. As such, decision makers may construe
their ability to request additional inventory from the source as a way
of controlling their environment (“If more customers show up than expected, I can always do something about this by asking for more inventory from the other player!”). In contrast, the ability to sell inventory to
the other player may appear to offer less control over the environment
(“I surely can stock some extra units for the other player, but whether he
or she requests them from me is out of my control”). In turn, this asymmetry could lead to greater salience of the supply-side benefit of inventory sharing during the decision-making process.
Bias in others is easier for people to see than bias in themselves.
Transshipments are impossible if the potential recipient does not request inventory from the source. However, asking for a supplementary
inventory shipment is akin to asking for help. Seeking help may imply a
degree of admitting one’s own incompetence and creates a form of dependence on the other person (Lee 1997). Incompetence when making a request means that the recipient admits having placed an insufficient initial order. Dependence when making a request implies that the
recipient depends on the other player to satisfy his or her demand. In
other words, requesting units for transshipments imposes an extra psychological burden on the recipient; this would lead to less-than-optimal requests, which is consistent with our finding in Table 3. Although
this psychological burden applies to both a focal player and his or her
counterpart, people often spot and perceive bias in others more than in
themselves (Pronin et al. 2002)—“Although I am going to request whenever I need in order to take advantage of the sharing opportunity, I suspect the other player may be reluctant to request from me.” In turn, this
implies that decision makers may expect the other player to be reluctant to request inventory from them, but they may not see themselves
as reluctant to request inventory from the other player. This asymmetry may cause decision makers to underweight the demand-side benefit of inventory sharing.
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Valuing one’s own market more than the other’s market may also lead
to demand-side underweighting. Consumers value products in which
they have invested effort more than those without their investment of
effort (Norton et al. 2012). In Norton et al. (2012), subjects develop a
particular valuation for the outcome of their manual labor; in our context, we expect that subjects develop a particular valuation for the outcome of their risky inventory investment. Although manual labor is different from inventory investment, both represent a form of effort. The
logic underlying Norton et al. (2012) is built on the idea that “the more
effort people put into some pursuit, the more they come to value it” and
that the “successful completion of tasks [is] one crucial means by which
people can meet their goal to feel competent and in control” (Norton et
al. 2012, p. 454). In other words, people value the effort they put into a
task, particularly if that effort leads to success. Fulfilling their own demand out of ordered inventory can be construed as expanding effort to
succeed in a task. Transshipping inventory to a receiver thus may be seen
by subjects as supporting another player who failed in this task rather
than as succeeding in their own task. Such a construal would lead to different valuations.
5.2. Testing the Proposed Root Causes

To test these three proposed causes, we conducted three additional
treatments: minimum send, automated requesting, and sending reward.
Each treatment is designed to manipulate a corresponding root cause
(i.e., desire for control; see reluctance in requesting in others but not in
oneself and valuing one’s own market more than the other’s market).
By contrasting subjects’ orders under these three treatments with those
under our original treatments from Section 4.2, we can explore which of
the causes plays a role in subjects’ order decisions.
5.2.1. Experiment Design. The original high margin sharing conditions
from Section 4.2 are the baseline treatments underlying all factor variations in our new experiments. Under minimum send, a player who has
extra units is guaranteed to be able to send up to five units that the other
player must accept, even if the other player requests fewer than five
units or does not request any units from the player. Such a treatment
reduces the strategic uncertainty in the game and thereby increases a
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subjects’ control over their uncertain environments by enabling them
to send a minimum amount of excess inventory.
Under automated requesting, our software will automatically request
inventory at the optimal level for the player if he or she has a shortage
instead of letting the player request himself or herself. Each player still
decides whether and how much inventory he or she is willing to transship to the requesting player. This treatment tackles the second potential root cause of seeing a bias in others but not in oneself because requesting is now automated by software, and under-requesting will be
eliminated. The concern that “others will not request” is now reduced.
Under sending reward, for each unit of inventory the player sends to
the other player, the player will receive not only a transfer price from
the other player but also an additional five units of profit (paid from
an external source) as a reward. This simulates, for example, the situation where a dealer receives a discount for his or her next order from a
manufacturer every time he or she shares inventory to another dealer
in need, as in Caterpillar’s dealer inventory sharing system (Zhao et al.
2005). This additional reward should make the benefit of selling inventory to the other player more salient.
We ran these additional treatments under both high and low transfer prices. We otherwise used the same subject pool and design as in
our previous studies (although subjects who had participated in previous studies were not allowed to participate again). We collected data on
134 additional subjects.
5.2.2. Analysis. Our analysis in this section has to deal with two complications. First, the minimum send and sending reward treatments
manipulate the salience of the discussed root causes of demand-side
underweighting but also shift the rational optimal order quantities.
In particular, our theoretical analysis suggests that under minimum
send (sending reward), a rational player should order 240 (239) and
215 (216) under transfer prices of $35 and $15, respectively. In other
words, compared with the baseline treatments in Section 4.2, minimum
send and sending reward treatments should improve order quantities
by roughly three units even among rational players. To disentangle the
impact of the changed salience of the root causes from the rational response to incentives, we employ a different outcome measure: OrderGapi
= Orderi − OptimalOrderi, where Orderi represents the observed order,
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and OptimalOrderi represents the corresponding optimal order for rational players. This dependent variable corrects observed order quantities for the differences that naturally exist between treatments because
of changed optimal orders.
Second, these new treatments also influence subjects’ transshipment
decisions. Although in theory the actual transshipment decisions of another player should not influence a focal player, participants are likely to
react to such observed information as an increased extra supply through
transshipments, which could lower the order quantities of a focal player.
Similarly, increased observed extra demand from the other player could
increase order quantities. For example, we expect that under the sending reward treatment, subjects are more inclined to transship additional
inventory because of the additional reward. Although our main interest
is to examine whether this increased salience of the benefit of transshipments increases order quantities because of demand-side thinking,
subjects will also likely lower their order quantities because they have
received more extra supplies from the other player. To estimate direct
treatment effects, these indirect effects need to be accounted for in the
analysis. Therefore, to measure the extra demand EDi available through
transshipments, we calculate the average transshipment requests received by a focal player. The extra supply ESi through transshipment is
somewhat more intricate to measure because supply can only be sent
upon request. We thus calculate the average transshipments received by
a focal player over all time periods that he or she requested transshipments from his or her partner. Thus, EDi is averaged over all 30 time periods in the experiment, whereas ESi is averaged only over time periods
where requests are made. Treatment averages for these two measures
are summarized in Table A1 in the supplement.
Because EDi and ESi depend on players’ order decisions, they are potentially endogenous. To address this potential endogeneity issue, we
constructed the average excess supply XSi (i.e., XSi = mean ([Order−i, t −
Demand−i, t]+)) of a focal player’s partner as an instrument for ESi, and the
average excess demand XDi (i.e., XDi = mean([Demand−i, t − Order−i, t]+))
of a focal player’s partner as an instrument for EDi, where −i represents
focal player i’s partner. We believe that our instruments are exogenous
because XSi and XDi are determined by the random demand draw of the
partner, and the partner is also random matched every round. Furthermore, both instruments are relevant and strong because the first-stage
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regression shows that EDi is predicted with an R2 of 80% (minimum eigenvalue statistic of 550), and ESi is predicted with an R2 of 54% (minimum eigenvalue statistic of 20). Overidentification tests are not available
because the equations are just identified. The results of two separate
two-stage least squares regressions with either EDi or ESi being instrumented reveal that ESi is not endogenous (Wu-Hausman F = 0.06, p =
0.81) but EDi is endogenous (Wu-Hausman F = 5.45, p ≤ 0.05). Let the
three binary variables MINi, AUTORi, and REWARDi represent the three
experiment designs (namely, minimum send, automated requesting, and
send reward) and let Pi represent the transfer price. We thus simultaneously estimate the following system of equations using the generalized
structural modeling procedure in Stata:
OrderGapi = a11 Pi + a12 MINi + a13 Pi × MINi
+ a14 AUTORi + a15 AUTORi × Pi
+ a16 REWARDi + a17 REWARDi × Pi
+ γ1D1i + γ2D2i + γ3EDi + γ4ESi + ϵ1,i

EDi = a21 Pi + a22 MINi + a23 Pi × MINi + a24 AUTORi
+ a25 AUTORi ×Pi + a26 REWARDi
+ a27 REWARDi × Pi + δ1XDi + ϵ2,i
ESi = a31 Pi + a32 MINi + a33 Pi × MINi + a34 AUTORi
+ a35 AUTORi × Pi + a36 REWARDi
+ a37 REWARDi × Pi + δ2XSi + ϵ3,i

(5)
(6)
(7)

Notably, we did not employ this form of analysis in our previous experiment studies because their primary focus was to compare sharing with
no-sharing treatments and the extra demand and extra supply variables
are not defined under no-sharing treatments.
The estimation results are shown in Table 8. As expected, the extra
supply available through transshipments decreases order quantities (b
= −0.51, p ≤ 0.01), whereas the extra demand available through transshipments increases order quantities (b = 0.41, p ≤ 0.01). It is also apparent that our treatments increased the extra supply available through
transshipments under the low transfer price, whereas extra demand remains mostly unaffected by our treatments. For instance, under a low
transfer price, minimum send increases the average quantities received
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Table 8. Estimation Results in Testing Root Causes
Order

Dependent variable
TP = 35
Minimum Send
Minimum Send × TP = 35
Automatic Request
Automatic Request × TP = 35
Sending Reward
Sending Reward × TP = 35
Extra supply
Extra demand
Average demand (≤200)
Average demand (>200)
Partner excess supply
Partner excess demand
Constant
N

Coef.
0.42
16.37**
−18.22*
13.68*
−19.29**
18.78**
−27.32**
−0.51**
0.41**
0.90**
0.33†
0.40**
0.89**
−206.61**
184

Extra supply

SE

Coef.

SE

(5.77)
(5.67)
(7.64)
(5.87)
(7.71)
(5.78)
(7.38)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.22)
(0.19)
(0.07)
(0.04)
(43.42)

23.41**
18.46**
−23.16**
20.85**
−20.55**
23.20**
−15.92**

(2.72)
(2.79)
(3.89)
(2.82)
(4.02)
(2.70)
(3.89)

−11.49** (2.76)

35

Extra demand
Coef.

SE

−0.21
1.08
−4.44*
2.24
−0.05
0.69
−1.81

(1.34)
(1.37)
(1.93)
(1.40)
(2.00)
(1.34)
(1.93)

1.28

(1.52)

Coef., coefficient; SE, standard error.
** p ≤ 0.01 ; * p ≤ 0.05 ; † p ≤ 0.10

through transshipment by 18 units and does not impact the average
quantities demanded by partner players. Such an indirect counter effect of increased received supplies through transshipments will by itself lead to a decrease in order quantities. Therefore, minimum send
only marginally improves the average order quantities compared with
the corresponding base treatment (204 − 198 = 6; see Table A1 in the
supplement).
Once this indirect countereffect has been accounted for, we can establish the direct effects of our treatments. We observe a reduction in the
gap between the actual and optimal orders for low transfer prices under
minimum send (b = 16.37, p ≤ 0.01), automated requesting (b = 13.68,
p ≤ 0.05), and sending reward (b = 18.78, p ≤0.01). There is no effect of
our treatments under the high transfer price (the effect size for the three
treatments under high transfer price can be obtained by adding the coefficients of the treatment dummy and its interaction with transfer price).
Thus, our treatments succeeded both in increasing order quantities as
well as transshipments supplied under a low transfer price, a situation
where the natural benefit of sending transshipments is low. By manipulating the perceived control (minimum send), the reliance on the transshipment partner’s making adequate requests (automated requesting)
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and increasing the value of the transshipment (sending reward), we succeeded in manipulating behavior in the expected direction. Our manipulations suggest that all three root causes we mention seem valid; demand-side underweighting thus does not appear as a phenomenon with
a single root cause but is the result of several likely causes. This is not
surprising, given that the pull-to-center effect in newsvendor decision
making is also an empirical phenomenon with many likely causes.
It is interesting that the same manipulations were not successful under a high transfer price. This is surprising because, in principle, the
same psychological barriers to recognizing the demand-side benefits of
transshipments that are present under a low transfer price should also
be present under a high transfer price. A possible explanation may be
that ceiling effects kick in; given that order quantities are already higher
under the high transfer price, participants are reluctant to cross a certain order quantity perceived as an upper limit of their orders.
5.3. Additional Treatments

To further explore ways to mitigate demand-side underweighting, we investigate three additional experimental treatments: the first one deals
with the framing of the study; the second one deals with the sharing decisions by automating both the requesting and the sending decisions
(hence eliminating oversending and under-requesting behaviors); and
the third one directly deals with the stocking decisions through an advanced decision-support system.
First, it is plausible that the framing of our previous study has emphasized demand-side underweighting—subjects had to request inventory
from the other players, which naturally emphasizes the supply-side benefit. We will thus examine whether changing this frame allows us to deemphasize the supply-side benefit and emphasize the demand-side benefit instead. We thus studied two additional alternative forms of framing
the problem: customer-transfer framing and demand-side framing. Both
frames are mathematically equivalent to our original frame and also
practically relevant because they correspond to different ways to allow
transshipments to happen. Under the customer-transfer frame, a decision maker directs his or her excess customers to the other player instead of requesting extra inventory from the other player for these customers. In other words, the recipient player does not receive inventory
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from the source player to satisfy his or her demand. Instead, he or she
sends such customers to the source, who then satisfies the demand (with
a commission, i.e., the transfer price, to the recipient player). Note that
all financial transactions are the same as in our original experiment in
study 1 (so that the rational solution remains the same). This is akin to
retail stores from the same firm asking their customers to stop by a different store to pick up inventory. We believe that this frame deemphasizes the supply-side benefit (because the recipient now sends customers away). Such transferred customers have no long-term implications
for the recipients’ demand in our experiment (we told the subjects that
sending away customers is a one-time occurrence with no implications
for future demand). Nevertheless, this frame emphasizes the “lost business” aspect of insufficient inventory. Thus, we expect this frame to lead
to higher order quantities.
Under the demand-side frame, transshipments are initiated when
players propose to sell inventory to the other player instead of players requesting inventory to be transshipped. We believe that this frame
emphasizes demand-side benefit because players now initiate the sales
(instead of responding to a sales request from the other player). Hence,
compared with the original frame, this should increase the players’ order quantities.
We also designed a treatment with automated requesting and sending, under which the software will automatically make the optimal requesting/sending decisions. Under such a treatment, control over the
demand side and supply side have been equally rendered to the software. Therefore, subjects do not have to worry about the other player’s
reluctance and irrationality in both requesting and sending. As a result,
subjects can feed unbiased information about the inventory availability
of the system into their ordering systems, which used to be inflated because of the underrequesting and oversending behaviors. We thus believe that underordering could be mitigated.
Finally, akin to Bolton et al. (2012), we designed a new decision-support treatment, under which we told our subjects the optimal order
quantity. Specifically, given the transfer price of $35 ($15), the subjects
are told that the optimal order quantity should be 237 (212). In addition,
we also provided subjects with a plot of the expected profit under different order quantities to ensure that they understand the optimality of
the suggested optimal order. Nevertheless, as in practice, subjects could
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choose to accept the suggested optimal order quantity or to override it.

5.3.1. Experiment Design. Conditions 3 and 4 from Section 4.2 are
again the baseline treatments underlying all factor variations here. Under the customer-transfer frame, instead of asking for supplementary
inventory orders from a source, we ask players, “How many customers
do you want to send to the other player?”. Source players were then told,
“Please enter the number of customers you are willing to serve for the
other player.” The transfer price was explained as “the amount you have
to give to the other player for serving each unit of your own customer
demand.” Under the demand-side frame, we asked players, “How much
inventory do you want to offer to sell to the other player?”. Design and
subject pool were otherwise similar to our previous work. We collected
data from 186 additional subjects who participated across the eight (=
4 × 2) new treatments we ran.

5.3.2. Analysis. The analysis is like that in Section 5.2. Table 9 contains our estimation results. When comparing the order quantities under customer transfer with order quantities under our original framing,
it becomes clear that with the low transfer price, inventory orders are
increased in the customer-transfer framing (p ≤ 0.01). They remain similar under the high transfer price (p = 0.71). This result is as expected. In
the low transfer price scenario, in which supply-side benefits are most
salient, reframing the setting clearly decreases this salience and leads
to inventory order levels that are no different from newsvendor orders
without sharing inventory. In the high transfer price setting, in which a
supply-side benefit has little salience to begin with, customer transfer
has no further effect.
Although our expectations for the customer-transfer setting are supported by the data from the new experiments, our expectations for increased order quantities under the demand-side frame are not supported. Order quantities under the low transfer price here do not change
compared with the original frame (p = 0.17) and do not change under
the high transfer price either (p = 0.97). This is again the result of the indirect countereffect we discussed in the preceding section. In particular,
under the demand-side frame, participants offered too much inventory
to the other player (whereas under the original frame, supplementary
order requests were generally 4.5 units less than the optimum; under
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Table 9. Estimation Results in Additional Treatments
Order

Dependent variable

Coef.

SE

Extra supply

Coef.

SE

TP = 35
14.89** (5.33) 23.73** (3.45)
Demand side
8.16
(6.06) 41.85** (3.32)
Demand side × TP = 35
−7.97
(6.94) −20.12** (4.76)
Customer transfer
13.41** (5.43) 23.96** (3.50)
Customer × TP = 35
−11.60† (7.23) −22.06** (4.91)
Automatic Request & Send
10.58* (5.17) 16.64** (3.52)
Automatic Request & Send×TP=35 −6.17
(7.25) −24.10** (4.91)
Decision support v.2
16.41** (5.29) 20.56** (3.51)
Decision support v.2 × TP = 35
−12.48† (7.46) −25.33** (5.04)
Extra supply
−0.13
(0.09)
Extra demand
0.11
(0.11)
Average demand (≤200)
1.15** (0.18)
Average demand (>200)
0.39* (0.19)
Partner excess supply			
0.35** (0.10)
Partner excess demand 					
Constant
−34.61 (36.38) −10.03** (3.63)
N 			
236

39

Extra demand
Coef.
−0.89
−5.77**
−3.53
1.62
−5.58†
1.79
−0.06
1.49
−1.02

SE
(2.22)
(2.16)
(3.09)
(2.26)
(3.19)
(2.26)
(3.18)
(2.29)
(3.27)

0.72** (0.06)
7.12
(2.49)

Coef., coefficient; SE, standard error.
† p ≤ 0.10 ; * p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01

the demand-side frame, people, on average, offered 12 units more than
optimal to the other player). In other words, the frame changed the setting from people under-requesting to people oversending inventory. This
leads to the very rational perceptions of players that more than optimal
inventory is available from the other player through transshipments, emphasizing a supply-side benefit, in turn, and hence reduced initial order
quantities. This effect seems to offset any additional framing effects that
may be present. Indeed, the average number of units transshipped under demand-side framing is 14, which is much higher than the average
of nine units transshipped under the supply side framing.
The order quantities under automated requesting and sending increase by 10.58 units (p < 0.05) under the low transfer price and increase by 4.41 units (p = 0.37) under the high transfer price compared
with the order quantities under our original framing in Section 4.2. In
particular, the order quantity under the high transfer price is slightly
higher than the order quantity under the no-sharing treatment in Section
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4.2, which is a sign of overcoming the pattern of underordering. Thus,
not only does automated requesting and sending correct the bias in subjects’ transshipment decisions, but it also mitigates the underordering
behavior in their initial stocking decisions.
It is also clear that the decision-support tool generally increases order quantities, with an increase of 16.41 units (p < 0.01) under the low
transfer price setting and an increase of 3.93 units (p = 0.44) under the
high transfer price setting compared with the original framing in Section 4.2. Nevertheless, the increase in order quantities is not significant
under the high transfer price setting despite the fact that subjects are
explicitly told that the optimal order quantity should be 237 units. This
indicates that the bias is so strong that the subjects are willing to leave
money on the table (possibly because of the ceiling effect we mentioned
that subjects are not willing to order above a certain level); hence, some
intervention or education is needed to increase subjects’ compliance
with such a decision-support tool.
6. Conclusion
The analytical modeling literature on inventory sharing has emphasized
that this practice has the potential to simultaneously reduce inventory
and increase service levels (e.g., Tagaras 1989, Evers 2001). However,
this literature has always assumed rational decision makers and has not
considered that human decision makers can exhibit biased decision making. Using four behavioral studies, we found persistent and significant
underordering behavior among decision makers when provided with inventory sharing opportunities. Such behavior persisted even when decision makers had a decision-support system that suggested inventory
order quantities but permitted them to make revisions (the typical practice in industry). We identified demand-side underweighting as one evident underlying bias behind this underordering behavior. Specifically,
inventory sharing should confer a supply-side benefit (that others may
become an extra source of supply) and a demand-side benefit (that others may also become a secondary market to whom to sell extra inventory). However, its demand-side benefit is largely underestimated by
decision makers. Inventory sharing is perceived as rather a supply-side
than a demand-side phenomenon. For high-margin products, such underordering exacerbates the already low orders caused by pull-to-center
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behavior and can lead to much foregone benefit from risk pooling, as evidenced by limited improvement of service levels and profits. For lowmargin products, such underordering counterbalances the pull-to-center behavior and may drive the order quantity closer to optimal.
Our work provides some important managerial insights: First, unless
human behavior is considered, inventory sharing systems may forego a
portion of their promised risk-pooling benefits. Thus, during the implementation of such systems, the demand-side benefits of the system need
to be emphasized for decision makers. This may be achieved through (1)
appropriate emphasis to overcome demand-side underweighting bias,
(2) more robust decision-support systems with transshipment consideration to suggest stocking level, and (3) providing guidelines or automation of the inventory requesting and sending decisions to signal the
correct inventory availability of the system. Second, although the modeling literature emphasizes that to take advantage of risk pooling, initial
stock levels should be revised after inventory sharing opportunities are
provided, preventing decision makers from dramatic reductions in their
inventory appears more important from a behavioral perspective. Third,
the unwillingness of participants to share their inventory does not appear to be a major cause of the breakdown of inventory systems. More
blame seems to lie with overall insufficient inventory in the system coupled with players’ reluctance to request adequate inventory from others through transshipments. To improve the system, equal importance
is warranted to guiding the initial ordering process as well as to helping encourage reasonable requests.
As one of the first studies to consider inventory sharing from a behavioral perspective, our study opens many directions to explore. For example, to separate the impact of demand uncertainty, we look at a setting
in which there is no residual demand uncertainty when transshipments
are requested. In reality, decision makers often need to decide whether
they will share with others when their demand is not yet fully realized,
making a trade-off between the sharing opportunity now and potential
lost sales in one’s market in the future because of demand uncertainty.
Further, this research context provides a clear opportunity to study social preferences as well as social comparison effects. The act of sharing
may make people sensitive to the other players’ outcomes, whereas the
mere ability to observe decisions and outcomes from the other players
on a platform may lead to explicit or implicit performance comparisons.
In addition, future research may further explore the root causes of demand-side underweighting by surveying participants through verbal
protocol analysis such as the one reported in Gavirneni and Isen (2010).
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We hope that our research will lead to more behavioral studies in this
interesting area.
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Endnotes
1 The survey has parts focused on inventory management, forecasting, supply chain management, and sales and operations planning. To reduce time requirements, respondents answered only one of these four parts.
2 Note that this choice of parameters for the normal demand distribution scales the parameters from RKP by a factor of two. This deviation from RKP occurred because our original design included a model in which demand revelation was split into two stages. The resulting
experiments were removed from this paper to reduce complexity.
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Appendix I: Tables and Figures
Table A1: Summary of Experimental Data
Treatment
No Sharing - High Margin
No Sharing - Low Margin
Sharing - High Margin
Sharing - High Margin
Sharing - Low Margin
Sharing - Low Margin
No Sharing - Dec. Support
Sharing - Dec. Support
Sharing - Dec. Support
Fixed Role
Fixed Role
Minimum Send
Minimum Send
Auto Request
Auto Request
Sending Reward
Sending Reward
Customer Transfer
Customer Transfer
Demand Side
Demand Side
Auto Request & Send
Auto Request & Send
Decision Support v.2
Decision Support v.2

Transfer
Price

N

Order

Profit

Extra
Supply

Extra
Demand

35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15
35
15

26
24
24
26
26
26
20
20
20
43
40
24
22
20
20
24
24
24
22
26
26
24
22
20
22

209.74
194.07
206.89
197.79
187.50
185.80
225.30
216.22
209.43
201.28
194.96
208.07
203.84
199.69
198.75
201.60
201.84
206.66
208.01
200.09
197.02
213.53
203.29
212.94
210.07

3220.00
1040.31
3321.79
3293.09
1285.23
1295.06
3155.78
3333.22
3374.50
3051.42
3100.98
3231.78
3226.20
3208.97
3268.60
3443.90
3339.01
3116.69
3221.50
3231.44
3244.62
3376.50
3285.76
3391.38
3405.44

0.00
0.00
25.93
15.41
23.42
18.89
0.00
24.80
24.69
30.94
36.85
22.31
21.49
26.07
22.09
31.04
25.14
28.80
25.55
47.02
42.31
19.54
18.75
21.27
22.42

0.00
0.00
27.97
31.71
33.10
39.47
0.00
21.07
26.21
15.63
21.72
25.69
31.80
31.64
34.14
30.12
28.38
24.84
31.21
26.52
28.39
28.93
32.39
26.52
28.39

Notes. While in general, the average extra supply is below the extra average demand, the opposite can be true as well. Extra
supply is averaged only over time periods where requests were made, since extra supply must be zero otherwise. Extra demand
is averaged over all time periods, since requests can be made in any period. This difference in the denominator can lead to
average extra supply being greater than average extra demand. Further, the sequencing of extra demand/supply is revered in
the Demand Side treatment, leading to extra demand being less than extra supply.

Table A2: The Effects of Treatment and Order Quantity on Profitability
Model 1
Coef.

Model 2
SE

Coef.

(54.85)

-2032.76**

(48.02)

C3: High Margin – Low Transfer Price

185.40

**

(53.54)

174.74

**

(46.75)

C4: High Margin – High Transfer Price

223.91**

(54.36)

211.51**

(47.52)

**

(53.46)

-1787.76

**

(46.65)

C6: Low Margin – High Transfer Price -1792.59**

(53.56)

-1805.65**

(46.75)

4.34**

(1.66)

C2: Low Margin – No Sharing

-2019.42**

C5: Low Margin – Low Transfer Price -1780.49

Order Quantity @ C1
Order Quantity @ C2

SE

-2.72

*

(1.38)

Order Quantity @ C3

5.43**

(1.74)

Order Quantity @ C4

7.79

**

(1.71)

Order Quantity @ C5

-3.95**

(1.27)

Order Quantity @ C6

0.31

(1.46)

Average Demand (≤200)

11.17**

(2.77)

9.66**

(2.57)

Average Demand (>200)

16.52**

(2.05)

14.96**

(1.88)

**

(1.41)

Demand Standard Deviation

-11.45

1593.91**

Constant
N
R2
Notes.

**

**

-12.21

1963.08**

(555.6)

152

152

97%

98%

p≤0.01. The omitted category is Condition 1, i.e. the high margin, no sharing condition.

Table A3: Robustness Test with Decision Support
Coef.
C3*: High Margin – Low Transfer Price
C4*: High Margin – High Transfer Price

SE

-14.56** (5.18)
-7.42

(5.09)

Average Demand (≤200)

0.73** (0.35)

Average Demand (>200)

0.42** (0.30)

Constant

78.96

(67.11)

N

60

R2

29%

Notes. **p≤0.01. C3* indicates that this condition is similar to C3 with the
addition of decision support. The omitted category is C1*. All coefficients
measure differences in order quantities compared to this condition.

1

(515.6)

Figure A1: Comparison of Order Quantities in the Sharing and No-sharing Situations under
Risk-Aversion

Optimal Order Quantity

260

Risk-aversion coefficient r=0.001

240
220
200
180
160
140
10

20

30

40

Transfer Price
no-sharing, risk neutral
no-sharing, risk averse

sharing, risk neutral
sharing, risk averse

Figure A2: Screen Shots of the Base Study - Initial Stocking Decision

2

Figure A3: Screen Shots of the Base Study - Requesting Decision

Figure A4: Screen Shots of the Base Study - Sending Decision

Appendix II: Representative Instructions for Experiment (Base Study, Condition 3)
This is an experiment in inventory decision making. During the experiment, you will play a game from
which you will receive cash earnings based on your performance. Upon completion of the game, you
will be paid your total earnings in cash plus a $5 show-up fee. If you have any questions, feel free to
raise your hand and we will assist you. Please do not communicate with other participants in the game,
3

and please refrain from using your cell phones.
Description of the Game. You are a retailer selling a product. To be able to sell the product, you must
first place inventory orders in advance of knowing the exact customer demand for that period. If the
realized customer demand during the selling period is less than the number of units you order (Order >
Demand), there will be some units that you ordered but cannot sell. While leftover units can be salvaged
at a price which is below the cost to order units, these units do not carry over to the next selling period.
Conversely, if the customer demand is greater than the number of units ordered (Demand > Order),
there will be some consumer demand that cannot be met.
There will be a total of 30 selling periods for your product. You will be randomly matched with a new
player in each selling period. After demand in a selling period is revealed, you will get a chance to
request additional inventory from that other player, and the other player will be provided with a similar
opportunity. Your goal is to maximize your total profits over all 30 selling periods.
Revenue/Cost Information
Retail Price (the amount you will receive for each unit sold to consumers):

40

Transfer Price (the amount you receive from the other player for each unit transferred):

15

Salvage Price (the amount you will receive for each unit that you do not sell or transfer):

10

Procurement Cost (the amount you have to pay per unit originally ordered):

20

Lost Sales Cost (the amount you have to pay per customer demand not met):

0

Transhipment Cost (the cost you have to pay to transfer a unit to the other player):

0

The other players with whom you will be matched face the same price/cost parameters.

Demand Information. Demand in each selling period is drawn from a Normal Probability Distribution.
Average demand is 200, with a standard deviation of 70.71. Demand in one selling period is
uncorrelated with demand in the next period.
Payoffs. The computer program will calculate your profits in every selling period. Your cash earning
in each selling period will be approximately
Real Cash Earning ($) = Profits x 0.0095%.
For example, if your Profits in a turn are equal to 3500, your Real Cash Earnings that period will be
about 33 cents. Note that your cash earnings will be negative if your profit for that round goes below 0.
Your total cash earnings in this experiment will be $6 plus your total cash earnings for the 30 decisions
rounds. The computer program will calculate your cash earnings for each selling period and your total
cash earnings for all the periods you have completed. We will pay your total earnings upon the
completion of the game by rounding them to the highest dollar amount and making sure that you receive
at least $6 (show-up fee). The maximum Earnings that we will pay out per participant is $24.
4

Appendix III: Proof of Proposition 1
To solve the optimal order 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽), we partition the demand space (𝐷1 , 𝐷2 ) as shown below.

Given realized demand (𝐷1 , 𝐷2 ) in each of the regions of the above figure, the corresponding
transshipment (𝑇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇𝑗𝑖 ), shortage (𝑍𝑖 , 𝑍𝑗 ), leftover (𝐿𝑖 , 𝐿𝑗 ) and sales (𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 ) are summarized below.
Transship(𝑇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑇𝑗𝑖 ) Shortage (𝑍𝑖 , 𝑍𝑗 )
𝛺1
0,0
0,0
𝛺2
0, 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖
0,0
𝛺41
0, 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖
0, 𝐷𝑖 + 𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑖 − 𝑄𝑗
𝛺42
0, 𝛼(𝐷𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗 )
𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖 − 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗 ),
𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 + 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗 )
𝛺3,51
𝛽(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 ),0
0, (1 − 𝛽)(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 )
𝛺52
𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 , 0
0, 𝐷𝑗 + 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑗 − 𝑄𝑖 )
𝛺6
0,0
𝐷𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖 , 𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗
Hence, player i’s expected profit is

Leftover (𝐿𝑖 , 𝐿𝑗 )
𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗
0, 𝑄𝑖 + 𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑖 − 𝐷𝑗
0,0
0,0
𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖 − 𝛽(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 ), 0
0,0
0,0

Sales (𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 )
𝐷𝑖 , 𝐷𝑗
𝐷𝑖 , 𝐷𝑗
𝐷𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖 + 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗 ),
𝑄𝑗 − 𝛼(𝑄𝑗 − 𝐷𝑗 )
𝐷𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 + 𝛽(𝐷𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗 )
𝐷𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 + 𝑄𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗

𝛱𝑖 (𝑄𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 ; 𝛼, 𝛽) = ∫ (𝑟𝑖 𝑅𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖 𝐿𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 𝑇𝑖𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗𝑖 𝑇𝑗𝑖 )𝑑𝐷𝑖 𝑑𝐷𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖 𝑄𝑖 .
𝛺

Thus, we have the following first-order condition with respect to 𝑄𝑖 ,
𝜕𝛱𝑖 (𝑄𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 ; 𝛼, 𝛽)
= 𝑣𝑖 𝑃𝑟(Ω42 + Ω6 ) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 𝑃𝑟(Ω2 + Ω41 + Ω52 ) + 𝑠𝑖 𝑃𝑟(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω51 ) − 𝑐𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
Since both players are symmetric, we have 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑄𝑗 = 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽) at equilibrium. Thus, we can solve
𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽) through the above first-order condition 𝜕𝛱𝑖 (𝑄𝑖 , 𝑄𝑗 ; 𝛼, 𝛽)⁄𝜕𝑄𝑖 = 0 . Next, we show that
𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽) decreases as 𝛼 increases and decreases as 𝛽 decreases.
Based on the derivative of implicit function, we have

𝜕𝑄(𝛼,𝛽)
𝜕𝛼

𝜕2 𝛱

𝜕2 𝛱

𝜕2 𝛱

optimal 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽), it suffices to show that 𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛼 < 0. We have
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω42 )
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω41 )
𝜕 Pr(Ω41 )
= 𝑣𝑖
+ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
= −(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗 )
< 0,
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝛼
5

𝜕2 𝛱

= − 𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛼 / 𝜕𝑄2 . Since 𝜕𝑄2 < 0 at the

Therefore, we have proved that 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽) decreases as 𝛼 increases.
Likewise, we can show that
𝜕2𝛱
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω51 )
𝜕𝑃𝑟(Ω52 )
𝜕 Pr(Ω52 )
= 𝑠𝑖
+ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
= (𝑐𝑖𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖 )
>0
𝜕𝑄𝜕𝛽
𝜕𝛽
𝜕𝛽
𝜕𝛽
Thus, we have proved that 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽) decreases as 𝛽 decreases. By definition, for rational players,
𝑄𝑠∗ = 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼 = 1, 𝛽 = 1). Hence, when 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽 < 1, we have 𝑄𝑠∗ > 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽); and when 𝛼 > 1
and 𝛽 = 1, we have 𝑄𝑠∗ > 𝑄𝑠 (𝛼, 𝛽).
Appendix IV: Structural Estimation of the Behavioral Model
Given a set of behavioral parameters 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ), we can solve the equilibrium order quantity
predicted by the behavioral model. In particular, for the no-sharing case, we can solve 𝑄𝑛 through the
𝑣−𝑐+𝛿𝑢
).
𝑢 +𝛿𝑜

modified critical fractile formula 𝑄𝑛 = 𝐹 −1 (𝑣−𝑠+𝛿

For the inventory sharing case, we can solve the predicted order quantity 𝑄𝑠 (𝜃) through the
following first-order condition,
𝜕𝛱𝑠
= (𝑣 + 𝛿𝑢 ) Pr(Ω42 + Ω6 ) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Pr(Ω2 + Ω41 + Ω52 ) + (𝑠 − 𝛿𝑜 ) Pr(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω51 ) − 𝑐 = 0
𝜕𝑄𝑠
For the fixed role treatment, we can solve the predicted order quantity for the recipient, i.e., 𝑄𝑠𝑟 (𝜃),
through the following first-order condition,
𝜕𝛱𝑠𝑟
= (𝑣 + 𝛿𝑢 ) Pr(Ω42 + Ω6 ) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Pr(Ω2 + Ω41 ) + (𝑠 − 𝛿𝑜 ) Pr(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω5 ) − 𝑐 = 0,
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑟
and solve the predicted order quantity for the source, i.e., 𝑄𝑠𝑠 (𝜃), through the following first-order
condition,
𝜕𝛱𝑠𝑠
= (𝑣 + 𝛿𝑢 ) Pr(Ω2 + Ω4 + Ω6 ) + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 Pr(Ω52 ) + (𝑠 − 𝛿𝑜 ) Pr(Ω1 + Ω3 + Ω51 ) − 𝑐 = 0
𝜕𝑄𝑠𝑠
Note that 𝛺4 = Ω41 ∪ Ω42 , 𝛺5 = Ω51 ∪ Ω52 . Essentially, given a set of parameters 𝜃 =
(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ), we can solve predicted order quantity (𝑄𝑛 , 𝑄𝑠 , 𝑄𝑠𝑟 , 𝑄𝑠𝑠 ). The observed order quantities in
the experiments, however, do not perfectly coincide with the model predictions due to various noises
at players’ decision processes. To capture the variation of the observed order quantities, we assume that
the average order quantity placed by a player i in the experiments is normally distributed with mean
specified by the behavioral model predication, i.e.,
𝑞𝑖,𝑛 ~𝑁(𝑄𝑛 (𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ), 𝜎𝑛2 )
2
𝑞𝑖,𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗 ~𝑁 (𝑄𝑠,𝑐𝑖𝑗 (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ), 𝜎𝑠𝑐
)
𝑖𝑗
2

𝑟
𝑟 (𝛼,
𝑟
𝑞𝑖,𝑠,𝑐
~𝑁 (𝑄𝑠,𝑐
𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ), (𝜎𝑠,𝑐
) )
𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑗
2

𝑠
𝑠 (𝛽,
𝑠
𝑞𝑖,𝑠,𝑐
~𝑁 (𝑄𝑠,𝑐
𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ), (𝜎𝑠,𝑐
) )
𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑗

where 𝑐𝑖𝑗 ∈ {15, 35} indicates the high or low transfer price.
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2

2

2
𝑟
𝑠
The noise parameters 𝜎 2 = (𝜎𝑛2 , 𝜎𝑠𝑐
, (𝜎𝑠,𝑐
) , (𝜎𝑠,𝑐
) ) are specific to each treatment, while the
𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑗

behavioral parameters 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿𝑜 , 𝛿𝑢 ) are specified to be common across all treatments because they
affect all players across these treatments. We estimate parameters 𝜃 and 𝜎 2 through maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE), as described below.
For shorthand, let 𝑡 denote the index for different treatments and 𝑁𝑡 denote the number of players
in treatment t. Let 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁𝑡 be the index for player in each treatment. Thus, the MLE is to find 𝜃
and 𝜎 2 so as to maximize the log-likelihood function for the observed order quantity, i.e.,
𝑁𝑡

max
ln(𝐿(𝜃, 𝜎
2
𝜃,𝜎

2 ))

2

1
1
(𝑞𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡 (𝜃))
= − ln(2𝜋) ∑ 𝑁𝑡 + ∑ ∑ (− ln(𝜎𝑡2 ) −
)
2
2
2𝜎𝑡2
𝑡

𝑡 𝑖=1

2

𝜎𝑞2𝑡 + (𝑞̅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡 (𝜃))
1
1
2)
= − ln(2𝜋) ∑ 𝑁𝑡 − ∑ 𝑁𝑡 (ln(𝜎𝑡 +
)
2
2
𝜎𝑡2
𝑁

where 𝑞̅𝑖𝑡 =

𝑡 𝑞
∑𝑖=1
𝑖𝑡

𝑁𝑡

𝑡

𝑡

, i.e., the average observed order for treatment t, and 𝜎𝑞2𝑡 =

𝑁

𝑡 (𝑞 −𝑞
2
∑𝑖=1
𝑖𝑡 ̅𝑡 )

𝑁𝑡

, i.e., the

variance of the observed order for treatment t.
Taking the first derivative of the log-likelihood against 𝜎 2 gives
2

𝜕 ln 𝐿
𝑁𝑡 1 𝜎𝑞2𝑡 + (𝑞̅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡 (𝜃))
=
−
( −
)
2 𝜎𝑡2
𝜕𝜎𝑡2
𝜎𝑡2
Thus, given 𝜃, we can solve the corresponding MLE estimator of 𝜎𝑡2 as
2

𝜎𝑡2 = 𝜎𝑞2𝑡 + (𝑞̅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡 (𝜃))

Substituting 𝜎𝑡2 back into the log-likelihood function, we have
1
1
2
ln 𝐿(𝜃) = − (ln(2𝜋) + 1) ∑ 𝑁𝑡 − ∑ 𝑁𝑡 (ln (𝜎𝑞2𝑡 + (𝑞̅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡 (𝜃)) ))
2
2
𝑡

𝑡

Thus, we can obtain the MLE estimator of 𝜃 through max ln 𝐿(𝜃), which can be done using
θ

commercial optimization software such as Matlab.
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